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INTRODUCTION 
This case tests whether a private-sector Internet company may 
regulate the content posted on its platform and enforce rules to prevent the 
distribution of abusive, racist, or dangerous content online.  Twitter, Inc. 
(“Twitter”) adopted the rule at issue here—barring accounts belonging to or 
affiliated with violent extremist groups—out of concern that allowing 
violent extremists on its platform could “chill[]” the speech of “opponents 
and bystanders” and “have dangerous consequences offline.”  App’x 694.  
It then enforced the rule against Real Parties In Interest Jared Taylor and 
New Century Foundation (“Plaintiffs”)—an individual and group described 
by public articles cited in their Amended Complaint as proponents of 
“crudely white supremacist” ideas.  App’x 979.  Specifically, Mr. Taylor 
“is the founder of” New Century Foundation, which “regularly publishes 
proponents of eugenics and blatant anti-black and anti-Latino racists.”  Id. 
 The right of Twitter and other Internet companies to adopt and 
enforce such community standards is guaranteed by Section 230 of the 
federal Communications Decency Act (“Section 230”) and the First 
Amendment.  Together, these federal laws protect Twitter’s “exercise of 
editorial control and judgment” and safeguard Twitter’s “choice of 
material” to disseminate through its platform.  Hurley v. Irish Am. Gay, 
Lesbian, & Bisexual Grp., 515 U.S. 557, 575 (1995); see also Barrett v. 
Rosenthal, 40 Cal. 4th 33, 43 (2006); 47 U.S.C. § 230. 
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The Superior Court’s ruling guts these protections.  Despite clear 
law to the contrary, the decision allows Plaintiffs to challenge Twitter’s rule 
barring violent extremist groups based on novel and flawed state-law 
theories that, if accepted as a viable basis for litigation, would produce far-
reaching and significant consequences for the ability of all Internet 
companies to adopt and enforce community standards and to protect users.   
Allowing this suit to go forward would cause Twitter irreparable 
harm by eliminating Twitter’s statutory immunity from the burdens of 
litigation.  Section 230 confers that immunity precisely to protect and 
encourage Twitter’s alleged conduct here—the exercise of editorial 
judgment and screening of objectionable content.  The Superior Court’s 
ruling that Twitter must face the burdens of litigation for exercising those 
very functions creates precisely the disincentives that Section 230 aims to 
avoid.  And it chills protected First Amendment conduct by signaling to 
Internet-communications platforms that they should think twice before 
updating community standards or removing harassing or abusive content, 
lest they provoke a flood of copycat litigation building on the Superior 
Court’s unprecedented and unsound theories.  Twitter thus seeks immediate 
review of the Superior Court’s order and a stay of all proceedings in the 
Superior Court pending this Court’s adjudication of Twitter’s petition for 
writ relief. 
12 
The Superior Court’s clearly erroneous rulings on the issues of 
widespread interest and public importance presented in this case require 
this Court’s intervention and warrant granting the writ.  See Omaha Indem. 
Co. v. Superior Ct., 209 Cal. App. 3d 1266, 1273-1274 (1989).    
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDATE AND/OR 
PROHIBITION OR OTHER APPROPRIATE RELIEF 
I. The Parties 
1. Petitioner Twitter, Inc. is a private-sector Internet 
communications platform that users can join and use for free.  App’x 399 
¶ 16; App’x 417-418 ¶ 62.  
2. Real Party In Interest Jared Taylor is a natural person well 
known for his “dissident” views regarding “mainstream thinking on race” 
relations, including his belief that members of racial groups have “the right 
to choose” to “remain[] the majority in their nation.”  App’x 406 ¶ 28; 
App’x 407, ¶ 37.  Mr. Taylor created a Twitter account in March 2011.  
App’x 406 ¶ 29. 
3. Real Party In Interest New Century Foundation is a 501(c)(3) 
organization founded by Mr. Taylor in 1994.  App’x 398-399 ¶ 13.  It 
conducts the activities of American Renaissance, a publication founded by 
Mr. Taylor to advance his views on race.  Id.  New Century Foundation 
created a Twitter account in June 2011.  App’x 406 ¶ 32.     
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4. According to materials cited in their Amended Complaint, 
Plaintiffs disseminate “crudely white supremacist” views.  App’x 979.  
Their gatherings are “typically banned from hotels and conference rooms as 
soon as the proprietors find out about [their] racist mission.”  App’x 983.   
II. Factual Background 
5. Twitter is a free online communications platform.  Its 
hundreds of millions of users use the platform to share their views, keep 
informed about current events, and learn from others.  App’x 399 ¶ 16; 
App’x 417-418, ¶ 62.  Twitter users stay connected by posting and reading 
“Tweets,” short messages limited to a certain number of characters.  App’x 
399 ¶ 16 
6. Twitter’s services are free, but users must agree to Twitter’s 
User Agreement, including Twitter’s Terms of Service and the Twitter 
Rules.  App’x 399 ¶ 16; App’x 401-402 ¶ 19; App’x 523-527; see also 
App’x 1004-1011.  Together these documents establish guidelines for who 
may maintain an account and what type of content can be shared.  App’x 
430-431 ¶¶ 97-98. 
7. An overarching goal of these community standards is to 
protect user safety online.  While Twitter aims to give “everyone … the 
power to create and share ideas instantly, without barriers,” Twitter also 
recognizes that “freedom of expression and open dialogue … mean[] little 
14 
as an underlying philosophy if voices are silenced because people are afraid 
to speak up.”  App’x 1005, 1007. 
8. At the time Plaintiffs joined the platform in June 2011, 
Twitter’s Terms of Service “reserve[d] the right at all times … to remove or 
refuse to distribute any Content on the Services and to terminate users or 
reclaim user names.”  App’x 993, 1000.  Later versions of the Terms of 
Service included an additional, overlapping provision stating that “[w]e 
may suspend or terminate your accounts or cease providing you with all or 
part of the Services at any time for any or no reason.”  App’x 430-431 ¶ 97; 
e.g., App’x 611, 668. 
9. As of June 2011, the Twitter Rules—a three-page, plain-
English document—stated that Twitter “will not censor user content, except 
in limited circumstances” described in a list of exceptions that, at the time, 
did not include affiliation with a violent extremist group as a basis for 
suspension.  App’x 524-526.  The very next paragraph after that statement, 
however, said that to “make Twitter a better experience for all … [w]e may 
need to change these rules from time to time and reserve the right to do so.  
Please check back [to the webpage hosting the Rules] to see the latest.”  
App’x 524. 
10. On November 17, 2017, Twitter announced “updated … rules 
around abuse and hateful conduct as well as violence and physical harm,” 
to be enforced “starting December 18.”  App’x 986; see also App’x 687-
15 
695.  This update added the Violent Extremist Group Rule, which states 
that users “may not affiliate with organizations that—whether by their own 
statements or activity both on and off the platform—use or promote 
violence against civilians to further their causes.”  App’x 694.  Twitter 
explained that this rule against violent extremist groups was necessary 
because allowing violent extremists on its platform could “chill[]” the 
speech of “opponents and bystanders” and “have dangerous consequences 
offline.”  Id.    
11. The Amended Complaint alleges that on December 18, 2017, 
Twitter suspended Plaintiffs’ Twitter accounts and informed them that the 
accounts were permanently suspended “because the accounts were ‘found 
to be violating … the Twitter Rules against being affiliated with a violent 
extremist group.’”  App’x 410-411 ¶¶ 45-46.  
III. Procedural History 
12. Plaintiffs filed this suit in February 2018 and amended their 
complaint a month later.  They seek a broad injunction, purportedly “on 
behalf of themselves, others similarly situated, and the general public,” 
ordering Twitter to reinstate their accounts, to cease enforcing “its facially 
overbroad policy on ‘Violent Extremist Groups,’” and to cease 
“suspend[ing] or ban[ning] users based on the user’s viewpoint or 
perceived affiliations.”  App’x 395; App’x 409.  
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13. The Amended Complaint raised three claims.  First, it 
asserted that Twitter violated Plaintiffs’ rights of speech and association 
under the California Constitution by suspending Plaintiffs’ accounts based 
on Plaintiffs’ political views.  App’x 415-427 ¶¶ 58-84.  Second, it alleged 
that Twitter violated the Unruh Civil Rights Act by “intentionally 
target[ing]” Plaintiffs’ accounts based on “their controversial political 
views” and “perceived political affiliations (e.g., as ‘far right,’ ‘alt right,’ 
and ‘extremist’).”  App’x 427-430 ¶¶ 85-94.  Finally—in the claim at issue 
here—it asserted that Twitter violated California’s Unfair Competition 
Law, which prohibits “unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business acts or 
practices,” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200, by allegedly “inserting 
unconscionable terms in its [user agreement] and deceptively advertising 
itself as a forum for free speech.”  App’x 415 ¶ 57; App’x 430-435 ¶¶ 95-
111. 
14. Specifically, Plaintiffs alleged that Twitter acted fraudulently 
in violation of the UCL by publicly portraying itself as a wide-open haven 
for free speech (such as by describing itself as “the free speech wing of the 
free speech party”), informing users in the June 2011 Twitter Rules that it 
“w[ould] not censor user content” except in limited circumstances, and 
promising that it would not make “retroactive” changes to its policies.  E.g., 
App’x 395 ¶ 1; App’x 434 ¶ 109.  
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15. Plaintiffs also alleged that Twitter’s user agreement was 
unlawful under the UCL because it violated the Consumer Legal Remedies 
Act’s (“CLRA”) prohibition against “‘[i]nserting an unconscionable 
provision in [a] contract.’”  App’x 431 ¶¶ 99-100.  Plaintiffs identified no 
theory of unlawfulness under the UCL other than the alleged violation of 
the CLRA. 
16. On April 24, 2018, Twitter filed a demurrer arguing that 
Section 230 of the CDA and the First Amendment each bar Plaintiffs’ 
claims at the threshold and that Plaintiffs’ claims fail to state a claim on 
their own terms.  Specifically, Twitter contended that Section 230 barred 
Plaintiffs’ three claims because they all sought to hold Twitter liable for 
blocking user-generated content.  App’x 956-957; see also Fair Hous. 
Council v. Roommates.com, 521 F.3d 1157, 1170-1171 (9th Cir. 2008) (en 
banc) (“[A]ny activity that can be boiled down to deciding whether to 
exclude material that third parties seek to post online is perforce immune 
under section 230.”).  And Twitter explained that the First Amendment also 
bars all of Plaintiffs’ claims because they impinge on Twitter’s right to 
18 
exercise editorial control in creating a safe environment for its user.  App’x 
957-960.1 
17. Twitter’s demurrer also explained that all of Plaintiffs’ claims 
also failed on their face, as a matter of California law.  With respect to the 
UCL claim that is the focus of this petition, Twitter demonstrated that each 
of the theories for a UCL violation pleaded in the Amended Complaint—
one based on alleged fraud by Twitter, the other based on alleged 
unlawfulness in the Twitter user agreement—was fatally defective. 
18. With respect to Plaintiffs’ UCL’s fraud theory, Twitter’s 
demurrer explained that the Amended Complaint failed to identify any 
specific statements by Twitter indicating its general support for free speech 
on its platform amounted to a factual representation that the company 
would never ban specific users.  App’x 966-969.  As for the statement in 
the 2011 Rules about the circumstances in which Twitter will censor user 
content, the demurrer pointed out that there was nothing false about that 
statement, either when it was written or more generally.  App’x 966.   
19. Twitter’s demurrer also explained that the Plaintiffs’ UCL 
unconscionability theory failed as a matter of California law.  The only 
                                              
1  Twitter also filed an anti-SLAPP motion, which was denied on the 
ground that Plaintiffs’ suit fell within the public-interest exception to anti-
SLAPP challenges in California Code of Civil Procedure § 425.17(b).  
App’x. 1334-1335.  Twitter does not challenge that ruling here.          
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purported unlawful act discussed in the Amended Complaint was an alleged 
violation of the CLRA’s prohibition on unconscionable terms in certain 
types of contracts.  App’x 966.  The demurrer argued that this case does not 
even implicate the CLRA because Twitter offers a free service and the 
CLRA extends only to “‘acts or practices undertaken by any person in a 
transaction intended to result or that results in the sale or lease of goods or 
services to any consumer.’”  Id.  (quoting Cal. Civ. Code § 1770(a)).  
Moreover, Twitter explained that it had not made a retroactive change to its 
user agreement.  As one of Plaintiffs’ own exhibits stated, the Violent 
Extremist Group Rule was announced the month before it took effect.  
App’x 967 (citing App’x 687-692). 
20. The Superior Court held a hearing on Twitter’s demurrer on 
June 14, 2018.  At the beginning of the hearing, the court issued a brief oral 
tentative ruling.  App’x 1334-1336. 
21. The Superior Court sustained Twitter’s demurrer without 
leave to amend as to Plaintiffs’ California Constitution and Unruh Act 
claims, holding them barred by Section 230(c)(1) of the CDA.  App’x 
1335.  Plaintiffs did not object to this ruling.  App’x 1336. 
22. Over Twitter’s objections, the Superior Court overruled 
Twitter’s demurrer as to Plaintiffs’ UCL claim.  See App’x 1335; App’x 
1343-1366.  Regarding Twitter’s threshold federal-law defenses, the court 
concluded that Section 230 does not apply to a UCL claim.  App’x 1335; 
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App’x 1350-1353; App’x 1360.  Although the court recognized that Section 
230(c)(1) “covers precisely the allegations in the first and second causes of 
actions,” App’x 1335—i.e., the claims that directly challenged Twitter’s 
actions in banning Plaintiffs allegedly on the basis of their political views—
the court thought the UCL claim “has nothing to do with viewpoint 
discrimination,” but instead concerns only “contract principle[s]” against 
unconscionability and deception, which the court viewed as outside the 
scope of Section 230.  App’x 1350; App’x 1353; App’x 1360.  For similar 
reasons, the court held that the First Amendment also does not bar the UCL 
claim, suggesting that the First Amendment does not allow Twitter to 
reserve the right in its user agreement to remove users based on their views 
or objectionable content.  App’x 1335. 
23. The Superior Court also held, over Twitter’s objections, that 
Plaintiffs’ UCL claim states a viable cause of action under state law.  With 
respect to the contention that Twitter acted fraudulently in violation of the 
UCL, the court concluded that Plaintiffs had stated a viable claim that 
Twitter made misleading or deceptive statements by suggesting that its 
platform “is open to everybody of all viewpoints” subject only to limited 
enumerated exceptions.  App’x 1359.  In support of that claim, Plaintiffs 
identified only one allegedly fraudulent statement that was neither a 
statement of opinion nor a generalized statement that no reasonable person 
could possibly be misled by, see App’x 1362-1364 (citing App’x 408-409 ¶ 
21 
40 & App’x 523-527)—namely, Twitter’s statement in the June 2011 
Twitter Rules, quoted in the Amended Complaint, that:   
Our goal is to provide a service that allows you to discover 
and receive content from sources that interest you as well as 
to share your content with others.  We respect the ownership 
of content that users share and each user is responsible for the 
content that he or she provides.  Because of these principles, 
we do not actively monitor user’s content and will not censor 
user content, except in the limited circumstances described 
below. 
App’x 408 ¶ 40 (citing App’x 524).  The court found that statement to be a 
sufficient basis for pleading a “fraudulent” act under the UCL because the 
enumerated exceptions to the alleged promise “not [to] censor user content” 
did not at the time include the Violent Extremist Group Rule and thus, in 
the court’s view, did not “cover viewpoint discrimination” of the type 
Plaintiffs allege.  App’x 1365.   
24. Twitter pointed out that the very next paragraph of the 2011 
Twitter Rules, immediately following the statement quoted in the Amended 
Complaint and relied on by the Superior Court, stated that “[w]e may need 
to change these rules from time to time and reserve the right to do so.  
Please check back here to see the latest.”  App’x 524; see App’x 1364.  
Twitter also pointed out that the same three-page document informed users 
that “Twitter reserves the right to immediately terminate your account, 
without further notice, in the event that, in its judgment, you violate these 
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rules or the terms of service.”  App’x 1364 (quoting App’x 526); see also 
App’x 1359-1360. 
25. The Superior Court determined that it could not consider 
Twitter’s counter-points.  The court stated that on a demurrer it was “only 
allowed to look at the first amended complaint” itself and could not 
consider “material[s]” outside the text of the Amended Complaint unless 
they were judicially noticeable, App’x 1360-1361—including the additional 
language in the June 2011 Twitter Rules on which Twitter asked the court 
to focus.  Thus, even though that language was set forth in an exhibit 
Plaintiffs had attached to their Amended Complaint, the court held that it 
had to be ignored at this stage.  App’x 1364-1366 (“We’re only on a 
demurrer.”). 
26. Regarding Plaintiffs’ alternative theory that Twitter’s user 
agreement is unlawful under the UCL because it includes an allegedly 
unconscionable provision in violation of the CLRA, the Superior Court 
recognized that Twitter was “probably right” that the Amended Complaint 
does not allege a viable CLRA/unlawfulness claim.  App’x 1344.  But 
rather than reach that issue, the court identified—and found that Plaintiffs 
could proceed on—different unconscionability theories (untethered to the 
CLRA) that the court acknowledged were not even mentioned in the 
Amended Complaint.  Id.  Focusing on “certain aspects of th[e] claim that 
the plaintiffs themselves did not identify,” App’x 1343, the court held the 
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Amended Complaint could be understood to assert a viable claim that 
Twitter’s user agreement violates either California Civil Code § 1670.5’s 
bar on unconscionable contract provisions or at least “common law” 
unconscionability principles.  App’x 1335; App’x 1345.   
27. Specifically, the court reasoned that the provision of the 
current Twitter user agreement—which the Court described as a “prolix” 
document—allowing Twitter to suspend a user’s account for “any or no 
reason” is arguably unconscionable, both procedurally and substantively.  
The court found the provision to be arguably procedurally unconscionable 
because Twitter, while allegedly knowing its platform to be a highly 
important medium for public discourse, nonetheless imposed the “any or no 
reason” provision on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.  App’x 1348-1349.  The 
court further found it to be arguably substantively unconscionable for 
Twitter “to deprive people of the most important platform to speak and to 
be able to seek redress of their legislators.”  App’x 1348. 
28. Because these unconscionability theories had not been 
presented in any filings, Twitter repeatedly requested the opportunity to 
submit supplemental briefing addressing them.  App’x 1344; App’x 1345; 
App’x 1351.  The Superior Court denied the request.  E.g., App’x 1345. 
29. On July 11, 2018, the Superior Court issued a formal order on 
Twitter’s demurrer, which duplicated its tentative ruling. 
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IV. Basis For Relief 
30. The Superior Court committed multiple clear errors of law 
when it overruled Twitter’s demurrer to Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint.  In 
doing so, the Superior Court laid out a roadmap for any litigant seeking to 
circumvent the rights of an online platform under Section 230 and the First 
Amendment:  Simply file an Unfair Competition Law (UCL) suit claiming 
either that (A) the litigant was deceived into believing that the platform’s 
community standards would remain static from the moment the litigant first 
joined the platform or (B) it is unconscionable for the platform to have 
memorialized its rights under Section 230 and First Amendment to adapt its 
rules over time.   
31. This approach cannot be squared with Section 230 or the First 
Amendment.  The gravamen of Plaintiffs’ UCL claim is that Twitter cannot 
reserve its right as a publisher to establish, modify, and enforce rules 
governing the content it disseminates.  The First Amendment protects 
Twitter’s editorial discretion to do exactly that, and Section 230 immunizes 
Twitter from liability and litigation—regardless of how the claims are 
styled—concerning Twitter’s exercise of that discretion.  The Superior 
Court correctly recognized these principles in dismissing Plaintiffs’ 
California Constitution and Unruh Act claims under Section 230.  The 
Superior Court’s failure to dismiss the UCL claims based on these same 
federal law principles constituted grave legal error. 
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32. Even as a matter of state law, the Superior Court’s rulings 
with respect to Plaintiffs’ UCL claim were incorrect.  It cannot possibly be 
fraudulent for a private-sector Internet company to maintain rules 
regulating its platform and to adjust those rules as needed to account for 
new or changing circumstances—particularly where that company, like 
Twitter, has consistently advised users that it “may need to change these 
rules from time to time.”  App’x 524; see also App’x 1005.  And it cannot 
possibly be unconscionable for a contractual provision to restate a 
background legal right that one party already enjoys.  But under the 
Superior Court’s reasoning, Twitter’s ability to control the content 
distributed through its platform—control that enables Twitter to protect 
users from outrageous or disruptive content—would be forever frozen in 
place by the particular rules in place at the moment a particular user joined 
the platform, even though Twitter expressly advised users that it could 
change the rules. 
V. Satisfaction Of General Grounds For Writ Review and Grounds 
For A Stay of Proceedings  
33. Twitter would suffer irreparable injury if the writ were not 
issued.  Specifically, Twitter’s immunity from suit conferred under Section 
230—immunity intended to protect it from the burdens of litigation—
would be rendered meaningless if it were forced to wait for a final 
judgment before appealing.  Moreover, if the Superior Court’s denial of 
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immunity were left in place, the decision would provide—and indeed has 
already begun to provide—a template for copycat suits against Twitter and 
other Internet companies, further undermining Twitter’s immunity from 
suit. 
34. Many of the traditional factors that favor granting a writ are 
met here.  First, this case involves an issue of widespread public interest 
because the Superior Court’s novel reasoning would apply to any 
communications platform based in California that hosts third-party content.  
Second, this case presents an issue of the first impression for this Court and 
one on which the only two superior courts to consider the question have 
split.  Third, granting the writ would finally dispose of this case, saving 
both the parties and the courts from expending further time and resources 
on meritless litigation.  
35. Moreover, an extraordinary writ is necessary because there is 
no “plain, speedy, and adequate remedy, in the ordinary course of law.”  
Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1086.  Twitter is barred from appealing the trial 
court’s order overruling its demurrer as to Plaintiffs’ UCL claim until final 
judgment is entered.  See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §§ 901-914; see also Bank of 
Am. Nat’l Tr. & Sav. Ass’n v. Superior Ct., 20 Cal. 2d 697, 701 (1942). 
36. Petitioner Twitter has a “beneficial interest[]” in the lawsuit, 
Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1086, because the Superior Court’s ruling directly 
affects its ability to control the speech disseminated on its platform, see 
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California Hosp. Ass’n v. Maxwell-Jolly, 188 Cal. App. 4th 559, 569 
(2010). 
37. This petition is timely because it is filed 26 days after entry of 
the Superior Court’s order, well under the 60-day presumptive time limit 
for writ relief.  E.g., Volkswagen of Am., Inc. v. Superior Ct., 94 Cal. App. 
4th 695, 701-702 (2001).   
38. Twitter also satisfies the criteria for obtaining a temporary 
stay of all proceedings in the Superior Court while this Court considers this 
petition for writ relief.  See Cal. R. Ct. 8.486(a)(7) (petition for stay must 
“explain the urgency”).  It is urgent that the Court grant such a stay 
because, as explained in the accompanying memorandum, the benefits of 
Twitter’s Section 230 immunity from suit would be irrevocably lost if this 
case were to move forward below.  See supra pp. 54-57.  If Twitter’s 
request for a temporary stay were not granted, Twitter would soon be 
required to file an answer (currently due on August 10, 2018) and otherwise 
devote extensive time and resources to pretrial proceedings, including 
discovery.  These are precisely the types of burdens that immunity defenses 
are intended to guard against.  See Big Valley Band of Pomo Indians v. 
Superior Ct., 133 Cal. App. 4th 1185, 1189 (2005) (“An immunity defense 
is effectively lost if an immune party is forced to stand trial or face the 
other burdens of litigation.” (emphasis added)).  And it is well settled that 
Section 230 protects entities such as Twitter not only from liability, but 
28 
from the burdens of litigation.  In similar circumstances involving 
immunity defenses, Courts of Appeal have granted stays pending writ 
review.  See, e.g., County of L.A. v. Superior Ct., 181 Cal. App. 4th 218, 
225 (2009); Big Valley Band, 133 Cal. App. 4th at 1189.  Twitter 
respectfully submits that a stay is likewise appropriate in this case.    
PRAYER 
Petitioners pray that that this Court: 
1. Issue an order (1) staying the Superior Court’s order 
overruling in part Twitter’s demurrer and (2) staying further litigation 
pending a ruling on Twitter’s petition for writ of mandate and/or 
prohibition or other appropriate relief. 
2. Issue a writ of mandate and/or prohibition directing the 
Superior Court to: 
a) Vacate the portion of its order overruling Twitter’s 
demurrer to Plaintiffs’ Third Cause of Action; and 
b) Issue a new order sustaining in full Twitter’s demurrer 
to Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint without leave to 
amend.  
3. Grant such other relief as may be just and proper. 
  
VERIFICATION 
I, Mark D. Flanagan, declare as follows: 
I am one of the attorneys for Petitioner. I have read the foregoing 
Petition for Writ of Mandate and/or Prohibition or Other Appropriate Relief 
and know its contents. The facts alleged in the petition are within my own 
knowledge, and I know these facts to be true. Because of my familiarity 
with the relevant facts pertaining to the trial court proceedings, I, rather 
than Petitioner, verify this petition. 
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of 
California that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed in New York, 
New York on August 3, 2018. 
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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES 
I. Standard Of Review  
A writ of mandate should be granted where, based on undisputed 
facts, “it is clear that the trial court abused its discretion,” or that 
“‘discretion can be exercised in only one way’” that the trial court failed to 
follow.  Robbins v. Superior Ct., 38 Cal. 3d 199, 205 (1985); see also Fair 
Emp’t & Hous. Comm’n v. Superior Ct., 115 Cal. App. 4th 629, 411-412 
(2004) (granting writ of mandate where trial court improperly overruled a 
demurrer).  A ruling that rests on legal error is “outside the scope of [the 
court’s] discretion” and subject to de novo review on a writ of mandate.  
Los Angeles Gay & Lesbian Ctr. v. Superior Ct., 194 Cal. App. 4th 288, 
300 (2011) (citing Toshiba Am. Elec. Components, Inc. v. Superior Ct., 124 
Cal. App. 4th 762, 768 (2004)); see also Fair Emp’t & Hous. Comm’n, 115 
Cal. App. 4th at 412 (“pure question of law” is reviewed de novo).  
 A writ of mandate “must be issued in all cases where there is not a 
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy, in the ordinary course of the law.”  
Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1086 (emphasis added).  Typically, a petitioner must 
demonstrate: (1) that it has no right to an immediate appeal; and (2) that it 
would suffer “irreparable injury” (i.e., harm or prejudice that cannot be 
corrected on appeal) if the writ were not granted.  Los Angeles Gay & 
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Lesbian Ctr., 194 Cal. App. 4th at 299-300.2  Other circumstances can 
independently warrant immediate interlocutory review, including (1) 
“widespread interest” in the issues raised by the petition, Brandt v. Superior 
Ct., 37 Cal. 3d 813, 816 (1985); (2) conflicting views in the lower courts on 
those issues, id.; (3) a significant issue of first impression in the petition, 
Casterson v. Superior Ct., 101 Cal. App. 4th 177, 182 (2002); and (4) the 
prospect that resolving the issue or issues in the petition might finally 
dispose of the underlying case, id.  California courts have granted writs of 
mandate in some cases based solely on these additional factors without 
considering the “irreparable harm” standard.  E.g., id. at 182 (writ review 
warranted where petition raised an issue of first impression and resolution 
would result in a final disposition as to petitioner); Noe v. Superior Ct., 237 
Cal. App. 4th 316, 325 (2015) (writ review appropriate where petition 
presented significant issue of first impression); Pugliese v. Superior Ct. 146 
Cal. App. 4th 1444, 1448 (2007) (same).   
                                              
2  It is indisputable that Twitter has the requisite “beneficial[] 
interest[]” in the lawsuit since the ruling below directly affects its ability to 
control the content disseminated on its platform.  Cal. Civ. Proc. Code 
§ 1086. 
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II. The Superior Court Committed Grave Errors Of Law In Ruling 
That Plaintiffs Stated An Actionable UCL Claim 
A. The UCL Claim Is Barred By The First Amendment And 
Section 230 
In sustaining Twitter’s demurrer as to the California Constitution 
and Unruh Act claims, the Superior Court correctly recognized that 47 
U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) protects Twitter from “precisely” those claims that seek 
to attack its control over the content it disseminates on its platform.  App’x 
1335.  The same analysis should have disposed of Plaintiffs’ UCL claim.  
The gravamen of that claim is that Twitter cannot reserve its right as a 
publisher to set and enforce rules governing what or whose content it will 
or will not distribute through its platform.  But that is a core First 
Amendment right; and Section 230 was enacted precisely to encourage 
platforms to actively self-regulate third-party content and immunizes 
Twitter for that conduct.  The Superior Court committed clear error in 
overruling Twitter’s demurrer. 
Twitter’s decisions on what or whose content to distribute are 
quintessential editorial judgments protected by the First Amendment.  A 
private-sector communications platform cannot be compelled to 
disseminate a message it finds objectionable solely because its decision to 
exclude the message would deprive another of a private platform from 
which to speak.  Hurley, 515 U.S. at 569-570.  The First Amendment 
safeguards the “choice of material … [that]—whether fair or unfair—
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constitute[s] the exercise of editorial control and judgment.”  Id. at 575.  
Thus, a newspaper cannot be forced to publish op-eds with which it 
disagrees or simply wishes to exclude, Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. 
Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 257-258 (1974), and private citizens organizing a 
parade on city streets cannot be compelled “to include among the marchers 
a group imparting a message that organizers do not wish to convey,” 
Hurley, 515 U.S. at 559. 
The Superior Court perceived a distinction between claims that 
directly challenged Twitter’s removal of user content and those that 
concerned only “contract principle[s]” regulating Twitter’s covenants with 
its users.  App’x 1353.  But Twitter’s reservation of its rights to modify its 
rules governing user content and to suspend users who violate those rules is 
no less central to Twitter’s fundamental right to engage in expressive 
speech than its acts of removing user content.     
Twitter’s adoption and enforcement of a rule barring users affiliated 
with organizations that “identify … as an extremist group” and “use or 
promote violence against civilians to further their causes,” App’x 694, 
constitutes protected expression by Twitter in at least two respects.  First, 
adopting and enforcing that rule conveys Twitter’s view that extremist 
violence is unacceptable.  Second, it declares Twitter’s unwillingness to 
serve as a medium for content that could chill the speech of other users of 
its platform or lead to dangerous consequences offline.  Like the parade 
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organizers in Hurley, Twitter’s “clear[] deci[sion] to exclude a message it 
did not like from the communication it chose to make” suffices to “invoke 
its right[s] as a private speaker” under the First Amendment.  Id.    
Section 230 likewise guarantees platforms like Twitter the freedom 
to self-regulate third-party content on their platforms.  Indeed, as the 
California Supreme Court has recognized, that is one of Section 230’s 
primary objectives:  “to promote active screening by service providers of 
online content provided by others.”  Barrett v. Rosenthal, 40 Cal. 4th 33, 53 
(2006).  Congress “contemplat[ed] [that] self-regulation” would best 
achieve that objective, “rather than regulation compelled at the sword point 
of tort liability.”  Id.  Section 230 thus “broadly shield[s] all providers from 
liability for ‘publishing’ information received from third parties,” id., in 
order to “remove disincentives for the development and utilization of 
blocking and filtering technologies” that can be used to block 
“objectionable or inappropriate online material,” 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(4). 
More specifically, Section 230(c)(1) immunizes interactive computer 
service providers like Twitter from liability for their “exercise of a 
publisher’s traditional editorial functions—such as deciding whether to 
publish, withdraw, postpone or alter content” created by third parties.  
Barrett, 40 Cal. 4th at 43.  As the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit has explained, “any activity that can be boiled down to deciding 
whether to exclude material that third parties seek to post online is perforce 
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immune under section 230.”  Fair Hous. Council v. Roommates.com, LLC, 
521 F.3d 1157, 1170-1171 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc).  Numerous courts 
have thus held that blocking or removing a plaintiff’s posts or, as is alleged 
here, suspending a plaintiff’s account, qualifies as “publisher conduct 
immunized by the CDA.”  Sikhs for Justice (SFJ) v. Facebook, Inc., 144 F. 
Supp. 3d 1088, 1094-1095 (N.D. Cal. 2015), aff’d, 697 F. App’x 526 (9th 
Cir. 2017); Riggs v. MySpace, Inc., 444 F. App’x 986, 987 (9th Cir. 2011) 
(Section 230(c)(1) immunizes “decisions to delete [plaintiff’s] user 
profiles”); Lancaster v. Alphabet Inc., 2016 WL 3648608, at *2-3 (N.D. 
Cal. July 8, 2016) (claims arising from platform’s removal of plaintiff’s 
videos barred by Section 230(c)(1)).          
In short, the provisions of Twitter’s rules and terms of service that 
the Superior Court found actionable simply make manifest Twitter’s 
established fundamental rights under the First Amendment and Section 230 
to exercise editorial judgment.  And as courts across the country have held, 
a provision of a contract that states expressly that a party has a right it 
would have even in the absence of the provision cannot possibly be 
unconscionable.  E.g., Quilloin v. Tenet HealthSystem Phila., Inc., 673 F.3d 
221, 234 (3d Cir. 2012) (“Quilloin fails to explain how a process allowing 
any employee the full amount of time permitted under law is 
unconscionable[.]”); In re Checking Account Overdraft Litig., 485 F. App’x 
403, 407 (11th Cir. 2012) (“Because the [provision allowing banks to set 
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off debts owed by the depositor against funds in the account] is explicitly 
permitted by North Carolina law, the set-off provision is not 
unconscionable.”); Abeyrama v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, 2012 WL 
2393063, at *4 (C.D. Cal. June 22, 2012) (“The arbitration agreements’ 
incorporation of rights that exist under state law cannot be deemed 
unconscionable.”).3  And it cannot be fraudulent for Twitter to tell its users 
that it intends to exercise the discretion reserved to it under Section 230 and 
the First Amendment by ensuring that its rules remain consistent with 
Twitter’s views about what content is acceptable.  Twitter’s rights of 
editorial control and self-regulation would mean little if the act of 
informing users of those rights could be actionably misleading.   
 Plaintiffs’ UCL claim thus should have been dismissed at the 
threshold for the same reasons that their claims under the California 
Constitution and the Unruh Act failed.  Like those claims, the UCL claim 
attacks Twitter’s Violent Extremist Group Rule for “allowing Twitter, a 
                                              
3  See also Evans v. Chase Manhattan Bank USA, N.A., 2006 WL 
213740, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 27, 2006) (“[T]he Court finds that the 
[contractual] terms are not unconscionable because they are specifically 
authorized by statute.”); Goldstein v. S&A Rest. Corp., 622 F. Supp. 139, 
143-144 (D.D.C. 1985) (the fact that “agreements [that] did not diminish 
any rights that plaintiff possessed prior to the execution of those 
agreements” showed that the agreements were not unconscionable); Dillard 
v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 961 F.2d 1148, 1155 (5th 
Cir. 1992) (“[A]greements to arbitrate disputes in accordance with SEC-
approved procedures are not unconscionable as a matter of law.”).   
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public forum under the … California Constitution that is required to respect 
the free speech rights of the public, to censor and ban users based solely on 
their political beliefs and affiliations.”  App’x 433 ¶ 105.  Plaintiffs 
themselves allege that their UCL claim “seeks to enforce the speech and 
petition rights of the general public.”  App’x 415 ¶ 56.  And the relief 
Plaintiffs request seeks not to compel Twitter to alter the “any or no 
reason” provision or issue a public correction of its purportedly fraudulent 
statements, but to enjoin Twitter to reinstate Plaintiffs’ accounts, stop 
enforcing its “facially over-broad policy on Violent Extremist Groups,” and 
“cease and desist … suspend[ing] or bann[ing] user accounts based on the 
user’s viewpoint or perceived political affiliations.”  App’x 435-436.  
“[W]hat matters is not the name of the cause of action,” but the substance 
of the claim and “whether the duty” the plaintiff seeks to enforce “derives 
from the defendant’s status or conduct as a ‘publisher or speaker.’”  Barnes 
v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1102 (9th Cir. 2009) (applying Section 
230).  Here, Plaintiffs’ UCL claim in substance embodies a rejection of 
Twitter’s rights under Section 230 and the First Amendment and impinges 
on its protected expression and editorial judgment no differently than their 
other claims.  The UCL claim should therefore have been dismissed with 
prejudice.   
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B. The Amended Complaint Fails To State An Actionable 
UCL Claim For Several Additional Reasons The Superior 
Court Either Did Not Consider Or Erroneously Rejected 
Even setting aside the Superior Court’s analysis of Section 230 and the 
First Amendment, the court independently committed serious errors of law 
in overruling Twitter’s demurrer to Plaintiffs’ UCL claim.  Each of the 
UCL theories that the Superior Court deemed to be viable is fundamentally 
flawed as a matter of California law.  That the Superior Court was forced to 
distort state doctrine in order to allow Plaintiffs’ claims to survive makes it 
all the more important that this Court grant the present petition in order to 
prevent the underlying action from proceeding at the expense of Twitter’s 
Section 230 immunity and First Amendment rights. 
1. The Superior Court Erred In Sustaining Plaintiffs’ 
UCL “Fraud” Theory 
 
The Superior Court committed clear legal error in concluding that 
Plaintiffs alleged a viable claim that Twitter engaged in fraudulent acts or 
practices in violation of the UCL.  To prevail on that theory, Plaintiffs must 
show that “members of the public are likely to be deceived” by specifically 
identified allegedly fraudulent statements.  In re Tobacco II Cases, 46 Cal. 
4th 298, 312 (2009) (quotation marks omitted).  As the First District has 
held, this inquiry focuses on “ordinary consumer[s] acting reasonably under 
the circumstances.”  Lavie v. Procter & Gamble Co., 105 Cal. App. 4th 
496, 512 (2003).  
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At the hearing on Twitter’s demurrer, Twitter argued that the 
statements by Twitter or its representatives that Plaintiffs claim were 
fraudulent were in fact too general, vague, or non-factual to support a claim 
under the UCL’s fraud prong.  The court directly asked Plaintiffs to identify 
any specific alleged statements that did not suffer from that shortcoming.  
App’x 1362-1364.  In response, Plaintiffs focused exclusively on one:  the 
statement in the June 2011 Twitter Rules stating that Twitter “will not 
censor user content[] except in the limited circumstances described below.”  
See App’x 524; see also App’x 1363-1366; App’x 408 ¶ 40; supra p. 41.   
The Superior Court embraced Plaintiffs’ argument that this 
statement is actionable under the UCL fraud prong, but that was plainly 
wrong as a matter of law.  In particular, when read in context—as the law 
requires but which the court erroneously found it could not do—no 
reasonable consumer could be misled by that statement.4  
Significantly, Plaintiffs attached to their Amended Complaint the 
full text of the three-page Rules document containing the “will not censor” 
statement.  App’x 523-527.  By doing so, Plaintiffs necessarily 
                                              
4  Plaintiffs also failed to plead that they actually relied on this 
purportedly fraudulent statement (likely because they did not).  See In re 
Tobacco II Cases, 46 Cal. 4th at 325.  Plaintiffs do not allege that Twitter’s 
allegedly fraudulent statements induced them to join or stay on the platform 
when they otherwise “in all reasonable probability” would not have.  Id. at  
326.  To the contrary, Plaintiffs allege that they made frequent and 
advantageous use of the platform.  App’x. 406-407 ¶ 33.   
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incorporated that document by reference.  This meant, “[f]or purposes of a 
demurrer,” that the court must “accept as true … [the] facts appearing in” 
the exhibit.  E.g., Mead v. Sanwa Bank, 61 Cal. App. 4th 561, 567-568 
(1998); see also Savings Bank of San Diego Cty. v. Burns, 104 Cal. 473, 
477 (1894) (“An exhibit, as attached to the complaint, forms a part of it, 
and must be so treated, [even if] no express words declaring it to be so are 
used.”).  In particular, to the extent “facts appearing in the attached exhibit 
contradict those expressly pleaded, those in the exhibit are given 
precedence.”  Mead, 61 Cal. App. 4th at 568.     
Here, the statement in the June 2011 Rules on which Plaintiffs 
exclusively focused and which the Superior Court deemed actionable was 
followed immediately by a warning that Twitter “may need to change these 
rules from time to time and reserve[s] the right to do so.”  App’x 524.  The 
Rules document also instructed the user to “check back here [i.e., the 
webpage that hosts the Rules] to see the latest.”  Id.  Here is an image of the 
relevant portion of the rules—as appended to the Amended Complaint—
with the provision on which Plaintiffs and the court relied highlighted in 
blue and the provisions that the Superior Court refused to consider 
highlighted in yellow:  
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App’x 524.  Immediately after the yellow-highlighted sentence followed 
the specific rules that were then in force and that spelled out “limited 
circumstances” in which Twitter might censor user content. 
The language highlighted above in yellow made it obvious to any 
ordinary reader that the “limited circumstances” under which Twitter would 
refuse to disseminate content could change or expand in the future.  And in 
light of this clear qualifier, the “will not censor” language on which 
Plaintiffs and the Superior Court focused cannot possibly be misleading.  
There can be no deception when “qualifying language appears immediately 
next to the representations it qualifies and no reasonable reader [can] ignore 
it.”  Freeman v. Time, Inc., 68 F.3d 285, 289-290 (9th Cir. 1995); see also 
Simpson v. Kroger Corp., 219 Cal. App. 4th 1352, 1371-1372 (2013) 
(where “the top and side panels of the tubs” containing butter substitute 
included labels informing the consumer “that the products contain both 
butter and canola or olive oil … [n]o reasonable person could purchase 
these products believing they had purchased a product containing only 
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butter”); Van Ness v. Blue Cross of Cal., 87 Cal. App. 4th 364, 375-376 
(2001) (brochure related to Blue Cross’s medical plan not misleading where 
the “brochure carefully explain[ed]” the statement plaintiff alleged was 
fraudulent).  
The Legislature could not have intended the UCL to bar a private-
sector communications platform from being able to modify its user rules to 
reflect changing circumstances and protect users from new or changing 
sources of harm, particularly where (as here) the platform expressly 
reserved the right to do so.  See California Sch. Employees Ass’n v. 
Governing Bd., 8 Cal. 4th 333, 340 (1994) (a court should not interpret a 
statute to “lead to absurd results”); see also Smith v. Superior Ct., 39 Cal. 
4th 77, 83 (2006) (when a statute is ambiguous, “we choose the 
construction that comports most closely with the Legislature’s apparent 
intent, … avoiding a construction that would lead to absurd 
consequences”); Purifoy v. Howell, 183 Cal. App. 4th 166, 175 (2010) 
(same).   
The construction of the UCL fraud prong adopted by the Superior 
Court, if left standing, would harm the public interest.  If communications 
platforms like Twitter faced the threat of actionable claims and the burdens 
of litigation every time they sought to make even minor adjustments to their 
user agreements and community standards, they would likely be deterred 
from responsibly self-regulating content distributed through their 
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platforms—to the detriment of users and society.  See Hassell v. Bird, 5 
Cal. 5th 522, ___, 234 Cal. Rptr. 3d 867, 885 (2018) (plurality op.) (“An 
injunction … can impose substantial burdens on an Internet intermediary … 
and could interfere with and undermine the viability of an online 
platform.”).   
Finally, a further reason to reject the Superior Court’s construction 
of the UCL’s fraud prong as applicable here is that it would trench on 
Twitter’s exercise of its authority—protected by the First Amendment and 
Section 230—to decide what content to publish or omit on its platform.  See 
supra pp. 32-37; Field v. Bowen, 199 Cal. App. 4th 346, 355 (2011) (“If a 
statute is susceptible of two constructions, one of which renders it 
constitutional and the other … raises serious and doubtful constitutional 
questions[], the court will adopt the construction which will render it free 
from doubt as to its constitutionality.”); Jevne v. Superior Court, 35 Cal. 
4th 935, 949 (2005) (“State law that conflicts with a federal statute is 
‘without effect.’”).    
Twitter presented all of these arguments to the Superior Court.  See 
App’x 1360-1366.  The Superior Court disregarded them, apparently 
because it believed it could not consider the full text of the 2011 Twitter 
Rules in making its ruling.  On demurrer, the Superior Court explained, it 
could only “look at the first amended complaint and anything that is 
judicially noticeable.”  App’x 1360-1361; App’x 1366 (“We’re only on a 
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demurrer.  I have to accept the well-pled allegations [of the Amended 
Complaint.]”).  According to the Superior Court, consideration of other 
“evidence” or “material[s]” would have to wait for a later stage of 
litigation—apparently without regard to whether those materials are 
incorporated in or attached to the Amended Complaint.  App’x 1360-1361.  
But as explained above, this is wrong as a matter of law.  See supra pp. 39-
40.  The Superior Court could and should have considered the full text of 
the June 2011 Twitter Rules, which show that the one and only specific 
statement Plaintiffs cited as fraudulent at the June 14 hearing could not 
possibly be found misleading.  Accordingly, the Superior Court’s 
conclusion that Plaintiffs stated a viable claim of fraudulent conduct under 
the UCL was clearly erroneous.     
2. The Superior Court Erred In Sustaining An 
Unconscionability Theory 
 
The Superior Court alternatively ruled that Plaintiffs stated a claim 
under the “unlawful” prong of the UCL on a legal theory that Plaintiffs 
themselves did not allege: that the provision in Twitter’s terms of service 
“to the effect that Twitter can, at any time, for any reason, or no reason, pull 
any account” is unconscionable under either California Civil Code § 1670.5 
or the common law.  App’x 1347; see also App’x 1350-1351 (the UCL 
claim “says that it is unconscionable for Twitter to reserve [its] right to 
revoke anybody’s ability to be on the platform for any reason at all”); 
45 
App’x 619 (relevant Terms of Service provision).  For several reasons in 
addition to Twitter’s federal-law defenses, the court erred as a matter of law 
in sustaining this theory. 
a) The “any or no reason” provision is not 
unconscionable as a matter of law 
First, a contract term cannot be unconscionable where the party that 
includes the term in the contract is offering a service for free or if a 
customer who did not agree with the provision could simply choose to use a 
different service.  Unconscionability has both “substantive” and 
“procedural” elements, with the former focusing on “overly harsh or one-
sided results,” and the latter focusing on “oppression or surprise due to 
unequal bargaining power.”  Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare 
Servs., Inc., 24 Cal. 4th 83, 114 (2000) (quotation marks omitted).  Both 
elements “must be present” for a court to find unconscionability.  Id.  But 
neither element meaningfully exists here.  
Twitter’s user agreement is not substantively unconscionable 
because it is “not so one-sided as to shock the conscience.”  Pinnacle 
Museum Tower Ass’n v. Pinnacle Mkt. Dev., LLC, 55 Cal. 4th 223, 246 
(2012) (“A contract term is not substantively unconscionable when it 
merely gives one side a greater benefit[.]”).  A provision in a user 
agreement that gives a communications platform “sole discretion” to 
remove content and “discontinue any aspect of [its] Service at any time” 
46 
does not satisfy this high bar when the underlying service is free.  See 
Darnaa, LLC v. Google, Inc., 2015 WL 7753406, at *2-3, *5 (N.D. Cal. 
Dec. 2, 2015).  Given the value that the Twitter service provides to its 
users—which the Amended Complaint itself attests to be very great, e.g., 
App’x 406-407 ¶ 33—and given that Twitter users generally pay no money 
at all to receive that value, it is appropriate and fair for Twitter both to 
impose conditions on how the service may be used and to reserve to itself 
an unfettered right to not provide, or to stop providing, the service to any or 
all users. In short, the “any or no reason” provision on which the Superior 
Court focused strikes an appropriate balance between the company and the 
user.   
As courts have recognized in cases concerning other Internet 
companies that provide communications services at no charge to their 
users, Twitter’s ability to provide a communications service for free 
depends in part on its ability to include in its standardized user agreement 
“provisions and protections” such as the one at issue here.  Song fi, Inc. v. 
Google Inc., 72 F. Supp. 3d 53, 63-64 (D.D.C. 2014).  Such contract terms 
eliminate or control costs of doing business that Twitter would otherwise 
face—for example, by ensuring that it does not have to litigate every 
decision it makes about who can use its platform.  Terms such as this 
thereby “‘make it possible for [Twitter] to provide [a platform] for free to 
hundreds of millions of users around the world.’”  Id. at 64.  For this 
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reason, courts “routinely enforce” contract terms that allow providers of 
free communications services to “modify the Terms [of Service], 
discontinue service, or remove content unilaterally.”  See id.  In light of the 
substantial benefits Twitter’s users receive for no charge, it is “reasonable 
for [Twitter] to retain broad discretion over these services.”  E.g., Darnaa, 
2015 WL 7753406, at *2-3.        
Here, Plaintiffs received the benefit of their bargain.  They were 
permitted to use Twitter for years without ever having to pay any fee.  
App’x 406 ¶¶ 29-32.  They used the Twitter platform to build their own 
businesses, employing Twitter to drive “traffic to [their] websites” and 
“alert” their supporters to “their recent publications, forthcoming 
conferences, public appearances, articles, videos, podcasts, and their 
commentary on the news of the day.”  App’x 406-407 ¶ 33.  Having “taken 
advantage of [Twitter’s] free services,” Plaintiffs cannot complain that 
contractual terms that reduce Twitter’s costs, and thus enabled Twitter to 
provide those services for free, are unenforceable.  Song fi, 72 F. Supp. 3d 
at 64.   
Nor is Twitter’s user agreement procedurally unconscionable.  The 
“adhesive nature of a contract” standing alone “does not mean that [the] 
contract will not be enforced.”  Sanchez v. Valencia Holding Co., 61 Cal. 
4th 899, 915 (2015).  Indeed, using an adhesion contract is unavoidable in 
this context given the scope of Twitter’s user base.  It would be impossible 
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to negotiate the terms of use with each of Twitter’s hundreds of millions of 
users. 
Moreover, as the First District has explained, even when a consumer 
is handed a take-it-or-leave it agreement, “the existence of ‘meaningful’ 
alternatives available to such contracting party in the form of other sources 
of supply tends to defeat any claim of” procedural unconscionability.  Dean 
Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Superior Ct., 211 Cal. App. 3d 758, 771 (1989).  
That is true even where available “alternatives [are] less desirable” or 
“inferior.”  E.g., Belton v. Comcast Cable Holdings, LLC, 151 Cal. App. 
4th 1224, 1246 (2007).   
In Darnaa, for example, the plaintiff argued that it was procedurally 
unconscionable for YouTube to require users to agree to terms similar to 
the “any or no reason” provision at issue here.  See 2015 WL 7753406, at 
*2, *5-6.  The Northern District of California concluded that any 
“procedural unconscionability [was] slight” because there were “various 
[other] websites on which a recording artist can display his or her music 
videos.”  Id. at *2.  Even though the plaintiff alleged that “YouTube ‘has 
emerged as the dominant, outcome-determinative website for displaying 
music videos,’” the existence of those alternatives defeated plaintiff’s 
unconscionability arguments.  Id.  
Here, Plaintiffs concede there are other “social media sites like 
Twitter” that serve as fora for public discussion.  E.g., App’x 399-400 ¶ 17; 
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see also App’x 408 ¶ 39.  While Twitter, like YouTube, is undoubtedly a 
“popular … website,” Darnaa, 2015 WL 7753406, at *2, Plaintiffs 
obviously can go elsewhere to promote their views and engage with their 
supporters.  Indeed, Plaintiffs allege they have created and maintain their 
own website precisely for that purpose.  See App’x 398 ¶¶ 12-13.  On their 
American Renaissance website, Plaintiffs “disseminate facts about race and 
race relations,” the same kind of material they allegedly seek to share on 
Twitter.  App’x 398-399 ¶¶ 12-13; App’x 406-407, ¶ 33; App’x 407 ¶ 37; 
see also App’x 978-981.  Because Plaintiffs have meaningful alternative 
ways to disseminate their views to the public, the Twitter user agreement is 
not procedurally unconscionable.       
b) Plaintiffs failed to allege causation 
The Amended Complaint also failed to allege that Plaintiffs’ 
accounts were suspended because of the challenged “any or no reason” 
provision.  This independently defeats their UCL claim, as the UCL 
requires Plaintiffs to show their injury was “caused by[] the unfair business 
practice … that is the gravamen of the claim.”  Kwikset Corp. v. Superior 
Ct., 51 Cal. 4th 310, 321-322 (2011); see also Two Jinn, Inc. v. Government 
Payment Serv., Inc., 233 Cal. App. 4th 1321, 1332 (2015) (“‘there must be 
a causal connection between the harm suffered and the unlawful business 
activity’”).  That requirement is not met when “‘a complaining party would 
50 
suffer from the same harm whether or not a defendant complied with the 
law.’”  Two Jinn, 233 Cal. App. 4th at 1332.  
Here, the Amended Complaint plainly and repeatedly identifies 
Twitter’s Violent Extremist Group Rule—and not Twitter’s contractual 
right to suspend users for “any or no reason”—as the cause of their 
suspension from the platform.  See, e.g., App’x 419 ¶ 67 (Plaintiffs and 
“other users [were] banned pursuant to the ‘Violent Extremist Group 
policy’”).  This allegation dominates the Amended Complaint.  From the 
outset, Plaintiffs allege that “Twitter banned hundreds of ‘right wing’ 
accounts (including those of Plaintiffs) pursuant to th[e] [Violent Extremist 
Group] policy.”  App’x 397 ¶ 6.  They further allege that when they 
appealed their suspensions, Twitter explained in writing “that the 
suspensions were permanent because the accounts were ‘found to be 
violating … Twitter Rules against being affiliated with a violent extremist 
group.’”  App’x 410-411 ¶ 45.  And they concede that “Twitter cited its 
policy regarding ‘Violent Extremist Groups’ as its sole ground for 
permanently banning the accounts of Plaintiffs and other similarly-situated 
users.”  App’x 422 ¶ 74 (emphasis added, citation omitted).  Indeed, the 
first form of injunctive relief that the Amended Complaint demands is “that 
Twitter cease and desist from enforcing its facially overbroad policy on 
‘Violent Extremist Groups.’” App’x 435.  The Amended Complaint makes 
no such demand regarding the “any or no reason” provision.   
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While the Amended Complaint references the “any or no reason” 
language in passing, it does not allege that Twitter invoked or relied on that 
provision in this case.  Instead, it speculates about hypothetical situations in 
which Twitter could rely on that provision to suspend other unidentified 
users’ accounts.  For example, it imagines that Twitter employees could 
“ban accounts” that “belong to an ex-girlfriend or ex-boyfriend” or for 
other “petty … reasons.”  E.g., App’x 432-433 ¶ 103.  That scenario is far 
removed from Plaintiffs’ theory of the case.  Additional paragraphs 
referencing the “any or no reason” provision simply conjecture that Twitter 
“could” or “would” be able to use the provision for what Plaintiffs’ deem 
improper purposes.  See, e.g., App’x 431-432 ¶ 101, 433 ¶ 104, 435 ¶ 111. 
Absent any plausibly alleged causal connection between the 
supposedly unconscionable provision at issue and Plaintiffs’ injury, their 
UCL claim is not actionable.   
c) UCL liability cannot be predicated on a defense of 
unconscionability  
Finally, it was clear error for the Superior Court to sustain the UCL 
claim using the defense of unconscionability as the supposed predicate for 
unlawfulness.  A viable claim under the UCL’s “unlawful” prong requires a 
“violation of another law [as] a predicate.”  Graham v. Bank of Am. N.A., 
226 Cal. App. 4th 594, 610 (2014).  Here, the sole “violation of another 
law” Plaintiffs put forth as a predicate for unlawfulness under the UCL was 
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that aspects of Twitter’s user agreement allegedly violated the CLRA, 
which provides an affirmative cause of action for damages and injunctive 
relief to remedy unconscionable terms in certain types of consumer 
contracts.  App’x 431 ¶¶ 99-100; see also Cal. Civ. Code § 1780(a).  The 
Superior Court, however, stated that Twitter was “probably right” that the 
FAC did not state any viable claim under the CLRA.  App’x 1344.5  But the 
court declined to reach that issue and instead relied on California Civil 
Code § 1670.5 and the common law as supposed support for a viable claim 
of unconscionability.  See App’x 1335, 1344-1345.   
That was clear error, because § 1670.5 and the common law—unlike 
the CLRA—do not create an affirmative cause of action for 
unconscionability, as the unlawful prong of the UCL requires.  The 
common-law “doctrine of unconscionability has historically provided only 
a defense to enforcement of a contract.”  California Grocers Ass’n v. Bank 
of Am., 22 Cal. App. 4th 205, 217 (1994); accord Howard v. Octagon, Inc. 
2013 WL 5122191, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 13, 2013); see also Rubio v. 
                                              
5  As Twitter argued below, Plaintiffs failed to plead any violation of 
the CLRA because the CLRA applies only to “acts or practices undertaken 
by any person in a transaction intended to result or that results in the sale or 
lease of goods or services to any consumer.”  Cal. Civ. Code § 1770(a) 
(emphasis added).  Far from alleging that they ever paid to Twitter’s 
platform, which would be necessary to support a CLRA violation, the 
Amended Complaint expressly acknowledges that “[a]nyone can join and 
set up an account on Twitter at any time.”  App’x. 399 ¶ 16. 
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Capital One Bank, 613 F.3d 1195, 1205 (9th Cir. 2010) (“ Under California 
law, … unconscionability is an affirmative defense, not a cause of action.” 
(citation omitted)).  Because § 1670.5 “does not in itself create an 
affirmative cause of action but merely codifies the [common-law] defense 
of unconscionability,” it “normally cannot be used offensively to obtain 
mandatory injunctive relief” absent “express” statutory authorization.  
California Grocers, 22 Cal. App. 4th at 217; see also, e.g., Jones v. Wells 
Fargo Bank, 112 Cal. App. 4th 1527, 1539 (2003) (“[T]here is no cause of 
action for unconscionability under section 1670.5; that doctrine is only a 
defense.”).  The CLRA exemplifies such express authorization, specifically 
providing that “[i]nserting an unconscionable provision in [a] contract” is 
“unlawful” and making clear that a CLRA plaintiff can seek injunctive 
relief.  Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1770(a)(19), 1780(a)(1).  In contrast, the UCL 
does not include “express authorization of an affirmative cause of action for 
unconscionability” that would justify making an exception to the general 
rule.  California Grocers, 22 Cal. App. 4th at 218.6   
                                              
6  California Grocers and Jones both assumed without deciding that 
there might be a viable UCL claim under the statute’s nebulous “unfair” 
prong—as opposed to the unlawful prong—but ultimately declined to grant 
relief.  California Grocers, 22 Cal. App. 4th at 218; Jones, 112 Cal. App. 
4th at 1539-1540.  Here, Plaintiffs do not allege that Twitter’s user 
agreement constitutes an “unfair” business practice under the UCL.  See 
App’x. 1223-1224.  
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No California state court has held that a defense of unconscionability 
can provide the predicate for unlawfulness under the UCL.  The Northern 
District’s decision in Howard lays out the proper analysis.  There, the 
plaintiff attempted to invoke the UCL as an affirmative cause of action to 
enjoin his former employer from invoking a mandatory arbitration 
provision in his employment contract.  2013 WL 5122191, at *7.  The court 
rejected this argument, explaining that “[u]nconscionability is a defense to 
the enforcement of a contract, not an independent cause of action.”  Id.  
Because the plaintiff did not rely on a discrete “statutory basis for asserting 
an affirmative cause of action for unconscionability,” his UCL claim failed 
as a matter of law.  Id.  
The same is true here.  Absent a viable CLRA claim—which 
Plaintiffs have not stated and cannot state—Plaintiffs cannot allege 
unconscionability as the predicate for unlawfulness under the UCL.   
III. Twitter Would Suffer Irreparable Harm If The Writ Were Not 
Granted And Has No Other Adequate Remedy 
If the requested writ were not granted, Twitter would suffer the 
irreparable harm of forever losing in this case the immunity from suit 
conferred by Section 230.  The fundamental purpose of an immunity from 
suit is to protect a party from being “forced to stand trial or face the other 
burdens of litigation.”  Big Valley Band of Pomo Indians v. Superior Ct., 
133 Cal. App. 4th 1185, 1189 (2005).  Such immunity is “rendered 
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meaningless” if the party that is supposed to be immune is instead forced to 
“proceed to trial” or “face the other burdens of litigation.”  Id.  
Accordingly, when a demurrer based on immunity is overruled, “the 
defendant asserting an immunity defense has a right to file a petition for 
extraordinary relief in the Court of Appeal litigating the propriety of the 
trial judge’s order.”  Samuel v. Stevedoring Servs. of Am., 24 Cal. App. 4th 
414, 423 (1994).  
It is well settled that Section 230 creates immunity not only from 
liability, but also from the burdens of litigation.  The statute states that 
“[n]o cause of action may be brought and no liability may be imposed” 
under any state or local law that would be inconsistent with Section 230’s 
broad protections for information content providers.  47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(3) 
(emphasis added).  As the California Supreme Court has recently 
reaffirmed, Section 230 “creates a federal immunity to any cause of action 
that would make service providers liable for information originating with a 
third-party user of the service.”  Barrett, 40 Cal. 4th at 43 (emphasis added) 
(quoting Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 329-330 (4th Cir. 
1997)); see also Hassell, 5 Cal. 5th at ___, 234 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 885 
(plurality op.) (“[S]ection 230 is not just a defense to liability; it instead 
confers immunity from suit.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Carafano 
v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1125 (9th Cir. 2003) (Section 230 
entitles service providers to “immunity from suit”); Nemet v. 
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Consumeraffairs.com, 591 F.3d 250, 254-255 (4th Cir. 2009) (“Section 230 
immunity, like other forms of immunity, is generally accorded effect at the 
first logical point in the litigation process.”).  Section 230 thus protects 
online service providers “not merely from ultimate liability, but from 
having to fight costly and protracted legal battles.”  Roommates.com, LLC, 
521 F.3d at 1175. 
Writ review is particularly necessary in cases involving erroneous 
denials of immunity from suit because no other remedy is available to 
correct the Superior Court’s erroneous ruling in time to avoid such 
irreparable harm.  Twitter cannot perfect an ordinary appeal from the 
decision without a final judgment on Plaintiff’s claims.  See Cal. Civ. Proc. 
Code § 904.1; Casterson, 101 Cal. App. 4th at 182 (“An order overruling a 
demurrer is not directly appealable, but may be reviewed on appeal from 
the final judgment.”).  And by the time a final judgment has been entered, it 
would be too late.  Once Twitter’s immunity from suit has been lost, it is 
lost forever.  See City of Stockton v. Superior Ct., 42 Cal. 4th 730, 747 n.14 
(2007) (finding writ review “clearly appropriate” where “[a] significant 
legal issue is presented, and the benefits of the … defense would be 
effectively lost if defendants were forced to go to trial”).   
Moreover, if the Superior Court’s denial of immunity were left 
undisturbed, it could provide a tempting model for copycat litigation—
further undermining the statutory immunity.  Indeed, two such suits citing 
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the ruling below as precedent have already been filed against Twitter.  See 
Am. Compl. ¶ 19, Brittain v. Twitter, Inc., No. 2:18-cv-01714 (D. Ariz. 
June 26, 2018), ECF No. 13; Compl. ¶¶ 45-47, Kimbrell v. Twitter, Inc., 
No. 4:18-cv-04144 (N.D. Cal. July 11, 2018). 
Not surprisingly, therefore, California appellate courts routinely 
grant the writ in cases like this one, where the trial court overruled a 
demurrer that raised an immunity defense.  E.g., Big Valley Band, 133 Cal. 
App. 4th at 361 (reviewing order overruling demurrer based on tribal 
immunity); Casterson, 101 Cal. App. 4th at 182 (same based on immunity 
under Cal. Educ. Code § 35330); American Arb. Ass’n v. Superior Ct., 8 
Cal. App. 4th 1131, 1133 (1992) (same based on arbitral immunity); Gates 
v. Superior Ct., 32 Cal. App. 4th 481, 487 (1995) (same based on immunity 
under state tort claims act).  This Court should do the same here.   
IV. The Other Traditional Factors Favor Granting The Writ 
While the threat of irreparable harm alone warrants grant of the writ, 
the stakes here extend beyond harm to Twitter in this particular case and 
implicate several additional factors that further militate in favor of 
immediate review. 
First, this case involves an issue of widespread public interest.  See 
Brandt, 37 Cal. 3d at 816.  Whether the Superior Court’s novel ruling 
stands is tremendously important not only for Twitter itself, but also for 
Twitter’s hundreds of millions of users and the providers and users of many 
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other online platforms.  E.g., App’x 397 ¶ 5.  The court’s reasoning would 
apply to any communications platform based in California that hosts third-
party content.  If adopted by other courts—as multiple copycat litigants 
have already urged in the weeks since the court’s oral ruling, see supra p. 
57—the Superior Court’s analysis would decimate those platforms’ rights 
to exercise editorial judgment about the content disseminated on their 
platforms, in violation of both Section 230 and the First Amendment.7   
That result could deter Twitter and other such platforms from 
adopting and enforcing policies that make the Internet safer for public use.  
Twitter adopted the Violent Extremist Group Rule—and places other limits 
on harassing and abusive conduct—to protect its users’ safety and 
experience both on and off the platform.  E.g., App’x 953.  As the current 
Twitter Rules explain, “freedom of expression and open dialogue … 
mean[] little as an underlying philosophy if voices are silenced because 
people are afraid to speak up.”  App’x 1007.  Under the Superior Court’s 
reasoning, however, Twitter and other Internet-communications platforms 
could find themselves unable to protect their users without assuming the 
risk of costly litigation. 
                                              
7  Although the Superior Court’s ruling cannot be cited in state court, 
Cal. Rule of Court 8.115(a), litigants in federal district court are not under 
the same restrictions, see supra p. 57.  Moreover, the ruling’s analysis can 
be relied upon by future state court litigants even if the ruling itself is not 
citeable.   
59 
 Second, this case presents an issue of first impression for this Court, 
and one on which there is a split of authority among the lower courts.  See 
Brandt, 37 Cal. 3d at 816; Pugliese, 146 Cal. App. 4th at 1448.  On July 3, 
2018, the Superior Court for the County of Fresno ruled that a lawsuit 
bearing similarities to the present action was barred in its entirety by both 
Section 230 and the First Amendment.  See Johnson v. Twitter, Inc., No. 
18-CECG-00078.  Like Plaintiffs here, Mr. Johnson alleged that Twitter 
had impermissibly suspended his user accounts on the basis of his 
“conservative political ideology, and thus discriminated against [his] free 
speech” on the Twitter platform.  App’x 1487.  Also like Plaintiffs, Mr. 
Johnson alleged that Twitter’s decision to suspend his accounts violated the 
California Constitution, the Unruh Act, and the UCL.  App’x 1481.  Indeed, 
Mr. Johnson went so far as to argue before the court in Fresno that his case 
“presents “an essentially identical [UCL] claim against Twitter” as the 
Plaintiffs’ UCL claim here.  See Plaintiff’s Second Notice of Supplemental 
Authority, Johnson, No. 18-CECG-00078 (June 15, 2018). 
Thus, allowing the decision below to stand without prompt review 
would subject Twitter to litigation based on novel theories that have never 
been approved by any appellate court and have been rejected by other trial 
courts.  In contrast, by granting the writ here, the Court of Appeal can 
provide guidance to aid in resolving this case and similar cases.  See 
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Volkswagen of Am., 94 Cal. App. 4th at 702 (granting writ review “to 
provide guidance to the trial in resolving similar claims.”).   
Finally, granting the writ could finally dispose of this case.  If this 
Court agrees that Twitter’s demurrer to the UCL claim should have been 
sustained, the case will end, saving both the parties and the courts from 
expending further time and resources on meritless litigation.  Such 
circumstances weigh in favor of granting review on a petition for a writ of 
mandate.  See Casterson, 101 Cal. App. 4th at 182 (petition raised issue of 
first impression and resolution of the issue in defendant’s favor would 
result in final disposition as to defendant); Fair Emp’t & Hous. Comm’n, 
115 Cal. App. 4th at 631-632 (writ appropriate where trial court has 
improperly overruled a demurrer).  Given the stakes in this case, the 
importance of the legal issues, and the grave errors in the Superior Court’s 




For the foregoing reasons, Twitter respectfully requests that the 
Court issue a writ as described in Petitioners’ Prayer.  Twitter also requests 
that the Court order a temporary stay of all proceedings in the Superior 
Court pending final disposition of this petition. 
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PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDATE AND/OR PROHIBITION OR 
OTHER APPROPRIATE RELIEF; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND 
AUTHORITIES 
to be deposited with the U.S. Postal Service by placing the document in a 
sealed envelope with postage thereon fully prepaid, in the United States 
mail at Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP, 950 Page Mill Road, 
Palo Alto, California, addressed as set forth below. I am readily familiar 
with the firm's practice for collecting and processing correspondence for 
mailing. Under that practice, on the same day that correspondence is 
placed for collection and mailing, it is deposited in the ordinary course of 
business with the United States Postal Service, in a sealed envelope with 
postage fully prepaid. 
The envelope was addressed and mailed as follows: 
The Superior Court of the State of California for the County of San 
Francisco 
Civic Center Courthouse 
400 McAllister St. 
San Francisco, CA 94102 
George Gascon 
District Attorney, County of San Francisco 
Hall of Justice 
850 Bryant St., Room 322 
San Francisco, CA 94103 
(415) 553-1751 
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I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of 
California that the foregoing is true and correct. 
Executed on August 6, 2018 at Palo Alto, Cali fomia. 
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~p~ 
Thomas G. Sprankling 
(SBN 294831) 
